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Footnotes
1. We are grateful to Professor Tejas Narechania for suggesting this
characterization of the Court’s Term.
2. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
3. 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
4. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
5. 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
6. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
7. 563 U.S. 731 (2011).
8. 548 U.S. 140 (2006).
9. 554 U.S. 164, 179 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quipping that
“the Court’s opinion does not even have the questionable virtue
of being politically correct”).
10. 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that
Congress’s delegation of authority to the U.S. Sentencing Com-
mission violates separation-of-powers principles by creating a
“junior-varsity Congress”).
11. 497 U.S. 836, 860 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
use of closed-circuit television for child witnesses violates the
Confrontation Clause; “[f]or good or bad, the Sixth Amendment
requires confrontation, and we are not at liberty to ignore it”).
12. 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Constitution permits Miranda v. Arizona to be replaced by statute;
“[t]he Constitution is not, unlike the Miranda majority, offended
by a criminal’s commendable qualm of conscience or fortunate fit
of stupidity”).
13. 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending
that the State may not take DNA samples from arrestees; “if the
Court’s identification theory is not wrong, there is no such thing
as error”).
14. 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
an anonymous tip of a traffic violation does not amount to rea-
sonable suspicion of drunk driving and accusing the majority
opinion of “serv[ing] up a freedom-destroying cocktail”).
15. 541 U.S. 615, 625 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).
16. 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (joining the
majority but expressing the willingness to find that officers
should not be able to search vehicles incident to arrest on the
ground of officer safety).
17. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
18. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
19. 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (911 call was not testimonial).
20. 557 U.S. 305 (2009) (forensic analysts’ affidavits were testimo-
nial).
In a way, we had not one but two Supreme Courts last Term.1The first Court sat from October 5, 2015, to February 12,2016. The Term of the successor Court began on February
13, 2016, when Associate Justice Antonin Scalia unexpectedly
passed away on a Texas ranch. We will review important crim-
inal-law decisions from both 2015-2016 Courts. But for those
who adjudicate, study, prosecute, or defend criminal cases, the
death of Justice Scalia was the most significant aspect of the
year. Whether one was a fan of his jurisprudence or not, it is
impossible to deny his outsized impact upon the Court for
almost three decades. We will begin by noting some of his most
influential criminal-law and procedure opinions before turning
to the rulings of the 2015-2016 Term.
JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW—A REMEMBRANCE
During his decades on the bench, Justice Antonin Scalia
authored transformative opinions in criminal law and proce-
dure. 
Justice Scalia shaped Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
with decisions such as United States v. Jones,2 the GPS-tracking-
device case, which reintroduced property-law principles in
determining what amounts to a search. He also wrote the dog-
sniff sequel of Florida v. Jardines.3 In Jardines, as well as in the
thermal-imaging-device case of Kyllo v. United States,4 Justice
Scalia established himself as the Court’s fiercest protector of
the home. Justice Scalia was less fond, however, of the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule, as demonstrated in Hudson v.
Michigan,5 which removed “knock and announce” violations
from the scope of the rule. 
Justice Scalia authored the foundational opinion in Whren v.
United States,6 upholding the pretext use of traffic infractions,
and in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,7 which did the same with material-
witness warrants. In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,8 he vigor-
ously supported a defendant’s right to choose retained counsel,
and he dissented in Indiana v. Edwards9 to support the right of
a defendant with a severe mental illness to represent himself.
His dissent in Edwards was characteristically fiery, just like his
disagreements with the majorities in Mistretta v. United States,10
Maryland v. Craig,11 Dickerson v. United States,12 Maryland v.
King,13 and Navarette v. California.14 Justice Scalia’s concur-
rence in Thornton v. United States15 directly led to the Court’s
change of position in Arizona v. Gant, which restricted searches
of automobiles incident to the driver’s arrest, though the jurist
would have gone even further.16 He also wrote for the majority
in District of Columbia v. Heller,17 finding that the District of
Columbia’s ban on handgun possession in the home violates
the Second Amendment.
It is difficult to select which of his opinions will have the
most lasting importance, but surely a leading contender is
Crawford v. Washington,18 which invoked the Confrontation
Clause to overturn the longstanding rule that an unavailable
witness’s out-of-court statement could be admitted if it bore
adequate indicia of reliability. He wrote for the Court in the
later Confrontation Clause cases of Davis v. Washington19 and
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts20 and then fought to prevent
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21. See Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 379 (2011) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that a gunshot victim’s statements were testi-
monial); Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2264 (2012)
(Kagan, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and
Sotomayor) (contending that a defendant has the right to cross-
examine the analyst who generated a DNA profile).
22. 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).
23. 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016).
24. Id. at 2059-60.
25. Id. at 2061.
26. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
27. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2061-63.
28. Id. at 2071, 2072-74 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 2064, 2069-71 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
30. Orin Kerr, Opinion Analysis: The Exclusionary Rule Is Weakened
But It Still Lives, SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2016, 9:35 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/opinion-analysis-the-
exclusionary-rule-is-weakened-but-it-still-lives/.
31. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009) (“To trig-
ger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently
deliberate . . . . As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary rule
serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct
. . . .”).
the Court from retreating from Crawford in a series of dis-
sents.21
Perhaps we may soon know whom President-elect Trump
will select to replace Justice Antonin Scalia. But whomever the
nominee may be, it is difficult to imagine a justice who will
have a greater or more lasting impact on constitutional crimi-
nal law and procedure.
Now on to the opinions from 2015-2016.
FOURTH AMENDMENT
The year provided two significant Fourth Amendment deci-
sions that matter for the day-to-day functioning of the criminal
law. The most noteworthy (and, for us, most puzzling) opinion
was Utah v. Strieff,22 which applied the attenuation doctrine to
uphold admission of evidence following an unconstitutional
investigatory stop. Strieff may narrow the exclusionary rule
going forward. Another important case this Term, Birchfield v.
North Dakota,23 addressed whether officers may obtain breath
or blood evidence of intoxication without a warrant as part of
a search incident to arrest. 
In Strieff, a detective received an anonymous tip of narcotics
activity at a home. He conducted intermittent surveillance and
stopped one visitor leaving the home. When the visitor,
Edward Strieff, produced his identification, the detective called
it in and learned that Strieff had an outstanding arrest warrant
for a traffic violation. The detective then arrested and searched
Strieff, finding methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. The
State conceded that the stop was without reasonable suspicion,
and the State only learned of the outstanding warrant and the
contraband as a result of the stop. The Utah Supreme Court
found that the evidence was inadmissible, but the U.S.
Supreme Court reversed.24
Writing for a five-justice majority, Justice Thomas noted
that under the attenuation doctrine, evidence is admissible
“when the connection between unconstitutional police con-
duct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by
some intervening circumstance” such that suppressing the evi-
dence would not serve the interest protected by the Fourth
Amendment.25 Analyzing the case under the factors articulated
in Brown v. Illinois,26 the Court found that while the temporal
proximity of the unlawful stop and the search favored exclu-
sion, two other factors counseled in favor of admission. The
warrant was an “intervening circumstance” because its exis-
tence predated the stop and was independent of it. Further, the
officer’s conduct was not purposeful or flagrant; it was, at
most, negligent.27
Three justices dissented. Jus-
tice Kagan, joined by Justice
Ginsburg, disputed the majority’s
application of the attenuation
doctrine, characterizing the
detective’s conduct as purposeful
and not an innocent mistake.
Nor were they willing to con-
sider the discovery of the war-
rant to be an intervening circum-
stance; it was a foreseeable con-
sequence of the stop, and the
detective testified that checking
for outstanding warrants was a normal practice. They con-
cluded that the majority’s opinion creates incentives for police
to make suspicionless stops.28
Justice Sotomayor also dissented in a forceful opinion
joined in part by Justice Ginsburg. In a section written only
for herself, Justice Sotomayor described the impact of unlaw-
ful stops upon ordinary Americans, and especially people of
color: 
For generations, black and brown parents have given
their children “the talk”—instructing them never to run
down the street; always keep your hands where they can
be seen; do not even think of talking back to a
stranger—all out of fear of how an officer with a gun
will react to them. . . . Until their voices matter too, our
justice system will continue to be anything but.29
It will be interesting to see the impact of Strieff in the years
ahead. One astute observer, Professor Orin Kerr, remains
unpersuaded by the majority’s analysis of the Brown factors. He
thinks of an “intervening circumstance” as “an outside event
that changes what is expected to happen,” and the stop here
“unfolded exactly as the officer expected it would.”30 We agree
and find it difficult to foresee how future courts will interpret
“intervening circumstances.” Further, a capacious definition of
“intervening circumstances” can substantially narrow the
exclusionary rule and create incentives for officers to conduct
suspicionless stops. In addition, along with Kerr, we note that
the majority inferred that the officer’s conduct was at most neg-
ligent, even though the record did not contain much evidence
either way. We will see whether this case leads courts to con-
sider officers’ subjective intent in assessing either attenuation
or the overall application of the exclusionary rule.31








rule . . . .
32. 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013).
33. See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2167-70.
34. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
35. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2176 (quoting Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484).
36. Id. at 2176-80, 2184.
37. Id. at 2178.
38. Id. at 2184.
39. Id. at 2186.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 2187 (Sotomayor, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
42. See id. at 2196 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
43. Assuming he voted with the majority in Strieff, there is a signifi-
cant chance that Justice Scalia would have been assigned to write
the opinion. Strieff was argued in the February 2016 sitting. We
note that Justice Thomas, who wrote for the Court in Strieff, was
also assigned the opinion in another case from the February sit-
ting, Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct.
1969 (2016). Assigning Strieff to Justice Scalia would have more
evenly spread the Court’s workload and perhaps made sense,
given his prior opinion in Hudson.
44. 136 S. Ct. 1609 (2016).
45. 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
46. 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016).
47. 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016).
48. 136 S. Ct. 2 (2015) (per curiam).
Birchfield is a sequel to Mis-
souri v. McNeeley,32 where the
Court found that the natural
dissipation of alcohol from the
bloodstream does not always
amount to exigent circum-
stances that justify taking a
blood sample without a war-
rant. All 50 states have enacted
“implied consent” laws, requir-
ing motorists to consent to tests
for blood alcohol concentration
(BAC) as a condition of driving.
Some states have also criminalized the refusal to undergo test-
ing. Birchfield addresses three different defendants’ appeals, all
related to whether an arrested person may refuse to consent to
a blood or breath test and whether that refusal may be crimi-
nalized. In all of the cases, the defendants were first placed
under arrest, and the officers later sought to obtain BAC evi-
dence.
Justice Alito’s majority opinion begins with a primer on
laws relating to driving under the influence, including
informed consent.33 The opinion then reviews the principles of
searches incident to arrest, culminating in the ruling two
Terms ago in Riley v. California.34 The Riley Court reaffirmed
the “categorical” approach to searches incident to arrest. The
authority to search depends on the fact of arrest and is permit-
ted to further officer safety and preserve evidence. In deter-
mining “whether to exempt a given type of search from the
warrant requirement,” courts assess “on the one hand, the
degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and,
on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promo-
tion of legitimate governmental interests.”35 Applying these
principles, subjecting motorists to a breath test does not impli-
cate significant privacy concerns, furthers legitimate govern-
mental interests, and may be performed incident to arrest,
without a warrant.36 “Blood tests are a different matter.”37 They
require piercing the skin, and give law enforcement a sample
that can be preserved and used for other purposes. They may
not be obtained without a warrant, incident to arrest.38 The
majority also found that, while implied-consent laws may
impose civil penalties and evidentiary consequences on those
who refuse consent, motorists “cannot be deemed to have con-
sented to submit to a blood test on pain of committing a crim-
inal offense.”39 The Court affirmed one defendant’s conviction
for refusing a warrantless breath test, reversed a conviction for
refusing a warrantless blood draw, and remanded where a
defendant submitted to a blood test after being told he had no
right to refuse.40
Five justices were in the majority. Justices Sotomayor and
Ginsburg dissented from the majority’s conclusion with respect
to breath tests. They disagreed with the application to breath
tests of the search-incident-to-arrest framework. They would
find that officers should obtain a warrant for BAC evidence
unless exigent circumstances exist in a particular case.41 Jus-
tice Thomas wrote separately to state his disagreement with
McNeely. He would instead hold that both blood and breath
BAC tests may be performed without a warrant due to exigent
circumstances.42
Strieff and Birchfield were both decided by the Court with-
out Justice Scalia. Would they have been decided differently
before his passing? Justice Scalia had strong views about the
scope of the exclusionary rule and the attenuation doctrine, as
Hudson shows. In McNeely, he joined the majority in finding
no exigent circumstances, as a categorical matter, to support
warrantless blood draws. His vote was not necessary to obtain
numerical majorities—each opinion commanded five votes—
yet his voice was loud on Fourth Amendment issues. We may
never know how these two opinions would read had he lived
to see them written—or, perhaps, had he authored them him-
self.43
SIXTH AMENDMENT
Last Term the Court issued a number of substantial Sixth
Amendment rulings, plus a per curiam reversal. Betterman v.
Montana44 answered whether the speedy-trial guarantee
applies to sentencing: it does not. In Hurst v. Florida,45 the jus-
tices overturned Florida’s capital-punishment system, reinforc-
ing the principle that the jury must find the facts necessary to
a capital judgment. Luis v. United States46 is an important rul-
ing about seizing assets that deprive a defendant of counsel of
choice. United States v. Bryant47 addressed the use of uncoun-
seled tribal-court convictions as predicate offenses for prose-
cutions under a federal statute. And in Maryland v. Kulbicki,48
the justices summarily reversed a state court that faulted
defense counsel for not uncovering a report about the validity
of a certain type of forensic evidence.










49. See Betterman, 136 S. Ct. at 1613.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1614. 
52. Id. at 1614-15.
53. Id. at 1616. In distinguishing between trial and sentencing, the
Court did “not mean to convey that provisions of the Sixth
Amendment protecting interests other than the presumption of
innocence”—such as the right to counsel—“are inapplicable to
sentencing.” Id. at 1615 n.4.
54. See id. at 1618 (Thomas, J., concurring) and id. at 1619
(Sotomayor, J., concurring).
55. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
56. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
57. 408 U.S. 447 (1984).
58. 490 U.S. 638 (1989) (per curiam).
59. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 623.
60. Id. at 624.
61. Id. at 624 (Breyer, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 624, 625-25 (Alito, J., dissenting).
63. 136 S. Ct. at 1088.
64. Id. at 1096 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
65. 136 S. Ct. at 1088.
SPEEDY TRIAL
Betterman is the Sixth Amendment decision with the broad-
est applicability. Brandon Betterman failed to show up in court
for a domestic-violence assault charge. He was charged with
bail-jumping and pleaded guilty to that offense. Betterman was
then held for 14 months before sentencing, and he argued that
the sentencing delay violated the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy
Trial Clause. The Court found, unanimously, that the Clause
does not apply to delayed sentencing.
Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsburg divided criminal
proceedings into three phases. The first phase, before arrest or
indictment, may be governed by the Due Process Clause,
which protects against fundamentally unfair prosecutorial con-
duct.49 The Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause applies in
the second period; it attaches upon arrest or indictment and
lasts through conviction. But this Sixth Amendment right then
detaches upon conviction, which triggers the third stage that
lasts until sentencing.50
The Court found that this division of the criminal proceed-
ing into three stages, with the Speedy Trial Clause only apply-
ing during the second stage, is consistent with the purposes
and historical understanding of the speedy-trial right. The
three-stage model “reflect[s] the concern that a presumptively
innocent person should not languish under an unresolved
charge.”51 Moreover, the language of the Sixth Amendment ref-
erences the “accused,” not someone already convicted.52 While
guilty pleas may be prevalent in our system, making sentenc-
ing the main event for most defendants, factual disputes at sen-
tencing do not relate to the question of guilt.53 To the extent
that sentencing proceedings are unduly delayed, rules of court
and the Due Process Clause may still be relevant. Justice
Thomas (joined by Justice Alito) and Justice Sotomayor con-
curred to address possible applications of the Due Process
Clause.54
RIGHT TO A DECISION BY A JURY
In Hurst, an 8-1 decision with Justice Scalia in the major-
ity, the Court overturned Florida’s capital-punishment scheme
because it does not require a jury to find the facts necessary
to sentence a defendant to death. Timothy Hurst received the
death penalty from a judge, who found sufficient aggravating
circumstances to impose a sentence of death following an
advisory verdict by a jury.
In the foundational case of Ring v. Arizona,55 the Court
found that Arizona’s capital-sentencing scheme violated the
Sixth Amendment (and the
Apprendi v. New Jersey56 line of
cases) because Arizona permit-
ted a judge rather than a jury to
find the facts required to sen-
tence a defendant to death. In
several cases, such as Spaziano v.
Florida57 and Hildwin v. Florida,58
the Court had expressed support
for Florida’s capital-sentencing
scheme, holding in both cases
that the jury need not make the
specific findings authorizing the
sentence of death. Hurst over-
turned Spaziano and Hildwin as irreconcilable with Apprendi
and Ring.59 The Court did not reach the question of whether
the error was harmless but overruled Spaziano and Hildwin “to
the extent they allow a sentencing judge to find an aggravating
circumstance, independent of a jury’s factfinding, that is nec-
essary for imposition of the death penalty.”60 Justice Breyer
concurred in the judgment.61 Justice Alito was the lone dis-
senter, arguing that a Florida judge essentially fills a reviewing
function and that any error was harmless.62
Apart from its importance for the state of Florida, Hurst
makes clear that Ring stands strong. A jury must make the fac-
tual findings necessary to sentence a defendant to death.
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
In the forfeiture ruling, Luis, Justice Breyer, joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, con-
cluded that “the pretrial restraint of legitimate, untainted assets
needed to retain counsel of choice violates the Sixth Amend-
ment.”63 Justice Thomas concurred, providing the fifth vote.64
The federal government charged Sila Luis in 2012 with
healthcare fraud in the amount of $45 million, almost all of
which she had already spent by the time she was indicted.
When the government caught up with her, Luis had $2 million
in her possession, which the district court ordered frozen for
potential future payment of restitution and other criminal
penalties, but which Luis wished to spend on her defense. The
government and Luis agreed that the frozen $2 million were
legitimate, untainted funds not connected to the alleged
crime.65
The plurality recognized that past Supreme Court cases
allowed the government to freeze a criminal defendant’s assets










stage . . . .
66. See id. at 1090-92 (citing United States v. Monsanto, 491 U. S. 600
(1989) and Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491
U.S. 617 (1989)). 
67. Luis, 136 S. Ct. at 1095.
68. Id. at 1095.
69. Id. at 1098 (Thomas, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 1096.
71. Id. at 1102 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67-68
(2004)).
72. Id. at 1109 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 1112 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
74. 136 S. Ct. at 1959.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 1959-60. Justice Thomas concurred to address aspects of
the Sixth Amendment and tribal sovereignty. See id. at 1967
(Thomas, J., concurring).
77. See Kulbicki, 136 S. Ct. at 4-5.
pretrial and prevent her from
using those assets to hire her
counsel of choice.66 They dis-
tinguished these precedents,
however, as limited to
restraint of a criminal defen-
dant’s tainted assets, that is,
those traceable to the crime
charged. In contrast, the
court order here prevented
Luis from using her own
money to hire the private
defense counsel of her
choice.
Justice Breyer’s plurality opinion reasons that the govern-
ment has a substantial property interest in tainted assets that it
does not have in untainted property. It also balances the inter-
est in the fundamental right to assistance of counsel against the
government’s contingent interest in securing criminal forfei-
ture and the victim’s interest in restitution and finds that the
Sixth Amendment right trumps. It notes the impact that an
opposite decision would have on the public defense system:
“accepting the Government’s views would—by increasing the
government-paid-defender workload—render less effective the
basic right the Sixth Amendment seeks to protect.”67 The plu-
rality additionally surmised that “the constitutional line we
have drawn should prove workable” because “the law has trac-
ing rules that help courts implement the kind of distinction we
require in this case.”68
Concurring, Justice Thomas agreed that freezing untainted
assets pretrial violates the Sixth Amendment, reasoning that
“constitutional rights necessarily protect the prerequisites for
their exercise.”69 He disagreed, however, with the plurality’s
“balancing approach,”70 arguing that such balancing “‘do[es]
violence’ to the constitutional design.”71
Justice Kennedy wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justice
Alito. His main criticism of the plurality was that the distinction
between tainted and untainted assets makes little sense because
money is fungible. “There is no difference,” he asserts,
“between a defendant who has preserved his or her own assets
by spending stolen money and a defendant who has spent his
or her own assets and preserved stolen cash instead.”72
Justice Kagan wrote a separate and short but intriguing dis-
sent. She would have revisited the “troubling” decision in Mon-
santo, which held that the government is allowed to freeze
tainted assets pretrial that the defendant needs to hire an attor-
ney. However, given that Luis did not ask the Court to overturn
Monsanto, Justice Kagan agreed with the principal dissent that
there is no difference between tainted and untainted assets,
since that money is fungible.73
This case will likely have the largest impact on white-collar
defendants, who might have legitimate assets in addition to
and separate from those linked to their alleged crimes, and on
the private criminal-defense bar, which may lose fewer clients
to public-defender offices. It will also be interesting to see if
counsel latch on to Justice Kagan’s dissent and try to challenge
the constitutionality of the Monsanto decision. Courts will also
have to hold traceability hearings or find another way to sepa-
rate tainted from untainted assets, which may prove more dif-
ficult than Justice Breyer predicts. 
The Term’s other right-to-counsel case was Bryant, which
concerned a conviction under a federal statute that makes it a
crime for any person to commit a domestic assault in Indian
country if the person has at least two prior convictions for
domestic violence.74 Bryant had multiple prior tribal-court con-
victions, which were uncounseled and included jail time. Had
Bryant been convicted in state or federal courts, those prior
convictions would have been obtained in violation of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. But it is well settled that the Sixth
Amendment does not apply to tribal-court proceedings. Writing
for a unanimous Court, Justice Ginsburg noted that the tribal-
court convictions “did not violate the Sixth Amendment when
obtained, and they retain their validity” when invoked as pred-
icate offenses in a federal prosecution.75 The Court’s opinion
also points to the high rates of domestic violence among Native
American women, the complex patchwork of law that makes it
difficult to address this violence, and the inability or unwilling-
ness of states to fill the enforcement gap.76
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Finally, in Kulbicki, the justices summarily reversed a state
court that had found that counsel’s performance was deficient
for failing to uncover a report about the reliability of bullet-
fragment forensic evidence. Kulbicki was convicted of murder
in 1995 in a trial where the State’s expert purportedly matched
the composition of lead in a bullet fragment in the victim’s
brain with a bullet fragment in the defendant’s truck. A 1991
report undermined the legitimacy of “Comparative Bullet Lead
Analysis,” although courts widely accepted this analytical
technique until 2003. The Supreme Court ruled that a diligent
search would not necessarily have discovered the early report
undermining the bullet expert’s analysis, so counsel’s perfor-
mance was not deficient.77
EIGHTH AMENDMENT
The Court decided three notable Eighth Amendment cases








to uncover a 
report . . . .
78. 136 S. Ct. 633 (2016).
79. 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
80. 136 S. Ct. 1818 (2016).
81. Carr, 136 S. Ct. at 642.
82. Id. at 645.
83. See Radley Balko, The Supreme Court’s Massive Blind Spot, THE
WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 22, 2015, https://www.washington
post.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/01/22/the-supreme-courts-
massive-blind-spot/ (noting that “[o]f our current Supreme Court
lineup, only two justices—Samuel Alito and Sonia Sotomayor—
have any significant experience with criminal law” and that
“[o]nly Sotomayor has real experience with a local, day-to-day
criminal justice system, and even that experience isn’t all that
overwhelming: She spent four and a half years as an assistant dis-
trict attorney in Manhattan, thirty years ago.”).
84. 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
85. Id. at 725-26. 
86. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
87. Id. at 2469.
88. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 729. The Montgomery case also involves
a thorny federal-question jurisdictional issue that is beyond the
scope of this project. See Jason M. Zarrow & William H. Milliken,
Retroactivity, the Due Process Clause, and the Federal Question in
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 68 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 42 (2015)
(unpacking the jurisdictional issue in Montgomery).
89. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 729.
this Term. Justice Scalia provided the majority opinion in one
and a dissent in another, and the third was issued after his
death. In Kansas v. Carr,78 the Court opined on whether the
Eighth Amendment requires courts to instruct capital-sentenc-
ing juries regarding the burden of proof for mitigating circum-
stances. Montgomery v. Louisiana79 raised the question of
whether the rule announced in Miller v. Alabama applies
retroactively on state collateral review. And in Lynch v. Ari-
zona,80 the Court summarily reversed the Arizona Supreme
Court, which had upheld the death penalty where the trial
court did not allow the defendant to inform the sentencing
jury that he was parole ineligible. 
In his last majority opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia
delivered the ruling in Carr, where eight justices agreed that
the Kansas Supreme Court improperly vacated the death sen-
tences of Sidney Gleason, Reginald Carr, and Jonathan Carr.
Gleason had participated in a conspiracy to rob an elderly man
and then murder Gleason’s co-conspirator and her boyfriend.
The Carr brothers committed a series of heinous crimes, set
out in excruciating detail in Justice Scalia’s majority opinion,
which culminated in the rape and shooting of five people, one
of whom survived to recount the horrific tale.
The Kansas Supreme Court vacated the sentences after find-
ing that the Eighth Amendment requires sentencing courts to
instruct juries that mitigating circumstances need not be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. Justice Scalia, however, wrote that
the Constitution requires no such thing. He concluded that
whether mitigating circumstances exist “is largely a judgment
call (or perhaps a value call),” rather than a factual determina-
tion amenable to a burden-of-proof determination, so a reason-
able-doubt instruction would only confuse the jury.81
The Kansas Supreme Court also found that the Carrs’ joint
capital-sentencing proceeding violated their constitutional
right to an individualized sentencing determination. Again, the
majority disagreed. Reginald argued that he was prejudiced by
Jonathan’s portrayal of him as the corrupting older brother and
Jonathan’s presentation of testimony from their sister that
tended to show that Reginald, not Jonathan, was the shooter.
Jonathan contended that the joint sentencing proceeding
caused the jury to unfairly associate him with his dangerous
older brother. Analyzing the issue under the Due Process
Clause, the Court found that any evidentiary unfairness during
the joint sentencing phase did not rise to the level of a consti-
tutional violation.82
Justice Sotomayor wrote a
lone dissent, in which she argued
that the Court never should have
taken these cases, where Kansas
merely overprotected the consti-
tutional rights of its citizens,
something states are permitted to
do with state law, if they so
choose. She criticized the major-
ity for unnecessarily cutting off
state experimentation by opining
on the best way for states to pro-
vide individual rights, “without
any empirical foundation or any basis in experience.” Leaving
the states alone to experiment, she noted, “is particularly
important in the criminal arena because state courts preside
over many millions more criminal cases than their federal
counterparts.” We would like to point out that Justice
Sotomayor is the only sitting justice with experience in a state
criminal-justice system.83
In the second Eighth Amendment case, Montgomery v.
Louisiana,84 the Court found that the rule announced in Miller v.
Alabama applies retroactively on state collateral review. In 1963,
when Henry Montgomery was 17 years old, he killed a deputy
sheriff and received a mandatory life sentence without parole.85
This would not lawfully happen today, since the Court in 2012
announced in Miller v. Alabama86 that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits states from imposing mandatory life without parole on
juveniles. Miller required sentencing courts to consider the
diminished culpability and high capacity for change of youth
offenders before imposing a life sentence. It also noted that life
sentences for juveniles should be “uncommon.”87 In Mont-
gomery, the Court clarified that the Constitution requires this
rule to apply even to cold cases like Montgomery’s.
The Court in Montgomery announced that “when a new
substantive rule of constitutional law controls the outcome of
a case, the Constitution requires state collateral review courts
to give retroactive effect to that rule.”88 Substantive, as
opposed to procedural, rules are those that “set forth categori-
cal constitutional guarantees that place certain criminal laws
and punishments altogether beyond the State’s power to
impose.”89 The majority reasoned that the Miller rule is sub-
stantive in that it “rendered life without parole an unconstitu-
tional penalty for ‘a class of defendants because of their [juve-
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nile] status.’” The rule therefore
applies retroactively.90 The
Court, however, assured states
that they “may remedy a Miller
violation by permitting juvenile
homicide offenders to be con-
sidered for parole, rather than
by resentencing them.”91
In his last dissent in a crimi-
nal case, Justice Scalia argued
that the decision of whether to
revisit an already-finalized conviction is entirely within the
State’s control—the Constitution, he said, does not have an
opinion either way.92 Justice Thomas wrote separately to
emphasize that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case in
the first place because it did not implicate any federal right.93
The third Eighth Amendment case, Lynch,94 was a per
curiam decision reversing the Arizona Supreme Court, which
had upheld the death penalty for Shawn Patrick Lynch. At
Lynch’s penalty-phase hearing, the State suggested that the
jury should impose death because Lynch could be dangerous
in the future. To rebut this argument, defense counsel asked
the trial court to inform the jury that Lynch was ineligible for
parole under Arizona law, but the court refused. The Supreme
Court found that this violated Simmons v. South Carolina,
which held that:
Where the State puts the defendant’s future dangerous-
ness in issue, and the only available alternative sentence
to death is life imprisonment without possibility of
parole, due process entitles the defendant to inform the
capital sentencing jury—by either argument or instruc-
tion—that he is parole ineligible.95
The high court in Arizona mistakenly thought that Simmons
did not apply because, under state law, Lynch could have
received a life sentence with eligibility for “release” after 25
years. The per curiam opinion notes, however, that because
Lynch only would have been eligible for executive clemency,
not parole, Lynch was entitled to the instruction on parole
ineligibility. 
In dissent, Justices Thomas and Alito criticized the majority
for “such ‘micromanage[ment of] state sentencing proceed-
ings.’”96 They were skeptical that knowing the current state of
the law on parole would impact a jury’s decision to impose a
death sentence. They also found the per curiam decision “a
remarkably aggressive use of [the Court’s] power to review the
States’ highest courts,” particularly given that Simmons was “a
fractured decision of this Court that did not produce a major-
ity opinion.”97 Justice Scalia, who passed away before the
Lynch opinion came down, had dissented in Simmons.98 We
might assume that, had he been alive when Lynch came down,
he would have joined Justices Thomas and Alito or authored
his own dissent.
DUE PROCESS & EQUAL PROTECTION
The Court decided the year’s most significant Due Process
and Equal Protection Clause decisions without Justice Scalia.
In Williams v. Pennsylvania,99 the Court clarified and expanded
its standard for when the Due Process Clause requires a judge
to recuse herself from a case. And in Foster v. Chatman,100 the
Court found that Georgia prosecutors were motivated by dis-
criminatory purpose in striking black jurors from a death-
penalty case. The Court also delivered a summary reversal.
In Williams, Justice Kennedy, writing for a five-justice
majority, stated that where a judge has had “significant, per-
sonal involvement in a critical trial decision” regarding the
defendant’s case, the Due Process Clause requires the judge’s
recusal.101 Terrance Williams murdered Amos Norwood in
Philadelphia in 1984. At that time, Ronald Castille was the dis-
trict attorney, and he gave his approval for the line prosecutor
to seek the death penalty against Williams. Williams was con-
victed and sentenced to death.
In 2012, Williams challenged his sentence in a post-convic-
tion petition, claiming that the line prosecutor at his murder
trial had violated Brady. That court stayed Williams’s execu-
tion and granted him a new sentencing hearing. The Com-
monwealth appealed. By this time, former District Attorney
Castille was the Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court. Over defense counsel’s objection, he joined the rest of
that court in overturning the lower court’s decision and rein-
stating the death penalty in Williams’s case. 
A majority of the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that
Williams’s due-process rights were violated when Chief Justice
Castille refused to recuse himself from the Commonwealth’s
appeal. Justice Kennedy reasoned that “[w]hen a judge has
served as an advocate for the State in the very case the court is
now asked to adjudicate, a serious question arises as to
whether the judge, even with the most diligent effort, could set
aside any personal interest in the outcome.”102 According to
the Court, Chief Justice Castille made a critical decision in
Williams’s case by authorizing the prosecutor to pursue the
death penalty, and that choice was significant in that, without
his express authorization, the prosecutor would not have been
able to seek the death penalty. Thus, Chief Justice Castille’s
previous involvement in the case created an “unacceptable risk
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of actual bias” that “so endangered the appearance of neutral-
ity that his participation in the case ‘must be forbidden if the
guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented.’”103
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, dissented, as
he did in the Court’s last major due-process recusal case,
Caperton v. Massey (there joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas,
and Alito).104 They would rather leave it “up to state authori-
ties—not this Court—to determine whether recusal should be
required.”105 Justice Thomas also wrote a separate dissent in
Williams, arguing that the majority opinion should have dis-
tinguished the due-process rights of criminal defendants from
those of parties in post-conviction proceedings.106
A few points are particularly worth noting. First, the major-
ity held that “an unconstitutional failure to recuse constitutes
structural error even if the judge in question did not cast a
deciding vote.”107 Thus, there is a due-process issue even if the
offending judge served on a unanimous panel and even, seem-
ingly, if the judge voted in the complaining party’s favor. 
Second, the majority did not limit itself to death-penalty
cases or invoke the Eighth Amendment. The holding therefore
appears to apply to any significant personal involvement a
judge has had in any critical trial decision, not just in decisions
in capital cases. 
Third, this case could have an interesting impact on how
former prosecutors make decisions about whether to recuse.
While “[m]ost questions of recusal are addressed by more
stringent and detailed ethical rules, which in many jurisdic-
tions already require disqualification under the circumstances
of this case,”108 Williams makes clear that these rules have con-
stitutional dimensions.
The eight-justice Court decided Chatman109 in May 2016 in
an opinion Chief Justice Roberts assigned to himself. The
Court first determined that the Georgia habeas court’s applica-
tion of res judicata principles to Timothy Foster’s Batson claim
was not independent of the merits of that claim; the justices
could therefore review the Batson issue.110 The Court then
found that state prosecutors were motivated by discriminatory
intent when they used their peremptory strikes to remove all
the prospective black jurors from Foster’s death-penalty case,
which violates the Equal Protection Clause.111
Foster supported his Batson case with an array of docu-
ments he obtained pursuant to a state open-records request,
including the jury-venire list, which showed that each black
prospective juror’s name was highlighted and notated with a
“B.” On each of the juror questionnaires, the juror’s response
indicating his or her race was circled. Foster also received a
draft affidavit prepared by the
state’s investigator at the prose-
cutor’s request, in which the
investigator wrote: “If it comes
down to having to pick one of
the black jurors, [this one]
might be okay” under one of
the black prospective juror’s
names. Foster received hand-
written notes on three black
prospective jurors, which
referred to those jurors as
“B#1,” “B#2,” and “B#3,” and a
handwritten list titled “definite
NO’s” that included all of the
black prospective jurors’ names. Another handwritten docu-
ment titled “Church of Christ” included a notation that read:
“NO. No Black Church.”112
Although the prosecutors presented alternative reasons for
why they struck each of the black prospective jurors, the Court
rejected these justifications, noting the State’s “shifting expla-
nations, the misrepresentation of the record, and the persistent
focus on race.”113 “[T]he focus on race in the prosecution’s file
plainly demonstrates a concerted effort to keep black prospec-
tive jurors off the jury.”114
Justice Alito wrote separately to assert that the state court
on remand could still reject Foster’s claim on state habeas
grounds.115 Dissenting, Justice Thomas accused the majority of
“[in]adequately grappling with the possibility that we lack
jurisdiction,” as it was unclear from the Supreme Court of
Georgia’s summary order whether it based its opinion on state
or federal law.116 “The Court today imposes an opinion-writing
requirement on the States’ highest courts.”117
In its per curiam decision in Wearry v. Cain,118 the Court
summarily reversed a Louisiana post-conviction court due to a
Brady violation. Michael Wearry had been convicted and sen-
tenced to death for murder in rural Louisiana in 1998. No
physical evidence connected Wearry to the murder, and the
prosecution built its case on inmate witnesses. But it later
became clear that the prosecution failed to disclose material
evidence that would have undercut the witnesses’ credibility.
The Court found that under settled constitutional principles,
this undermined confidence in the jury verdict and therefore
violated Wearry’s due-process rights. The state court erred by
evaluating the materiality of each piece of evidence individu-
ally, rather than cumulatively.119 Justices Alito and Thomas dis-
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sented. Although there was
“no question” that the prose-
cution should have disclosed
the information, they were
not sure that disclosure
would have affected the ver-
dict and thus disfavored a
summary reversal.120
SECOND AMENDMENT
The justices decided one
Second Amendment case, Cae-
tano v. Massachusetts,121 summarily reversing the Supreme Judi-
cial Court of Massachusetts. The Massachusetts court had found
that the Second Amendment does not protect stun guns for sev-
eral reasons, including that stun guns were not in common use
at the time of the Second Amendment’s enactment and are not
readily adaptable to military use. The U.S. Supreme Court
rejected these reasons as inconsistent with the holding in District
of Columbia v. Heller122 and remanded for further proceedings.123
Justices Alito and Thomas concurred, providing a much more
critical review of the state court’s holding.124
TIDBITS
The Court also decided a series of federal criminal cases and
issued a summary reversal in a habeas case, that, for our pur-
poses, are worth a brief mention.
In a closely watched case, McDonnell v. United States,125 the
Court unanimously reversed the federal criminal conviction of
the former Governor of Virginia, Bob McDonnell. The key part
of the decision is the Court’s interpretation of what amounts to
a proscribed “official act” within the meaning of the federal
bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201. The justices rejected an
expansive construction, ruling that that merely hosting an
event or meeting with others is not enough. Rather, the public
official must make a decision or take an action on the matter
by doing something specific and focused, such as deciding an
issue or exerting pressure on another official to do so.126
Another case of interest is Voisine v. United States,127 where
the Court ruled 6-2 that a federal law barring a person con-
victed of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” from
possessing a firearm includes convictions for reckless conduct.
The majority found no indication in the text, background, or
history of the statute that the firearms ban should be limited to
knowing or intentional conduct. “And the state-law backdrop”
to the federal statute, “which included misdemeanor assault
statutes covering reckless conduct in a significant majority of
jurisdictions, indicates that Congress meant just what it
said.”128
Welch v. United States129 is a sequel to last Term’s decision in
Johnson v. United States,130 where the justices ruled that the
residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18
U.S.C. § 924(e)(e)(B)(ii), was unconstitutionally vague. In
Welch, the Court determined that the rule announced in John-
son is substantive and thus applies retroactively to cases on col-
lateral review under the framework set forth in Teague v.
Lane.131
The summary reversal came in White v. Wheeler,132 where
the Court reversed the Sixth Circuit, as it has often done as of
late.133 The Sixth Circuit had granted habeas relief on Due
Process and Sixth Amendment grounds in a death-penalty case
where the Kentucky trial court had dismissed a juror for giv-
ing equivocal and inconsistent answers as to whether he could
impose the death penalty. The Court found that the lower
court misapplied the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which requires deference to the state
courts. The Court communicated its apparent exasperation
with the Sixth Circuit: “this Court again advises the Court of
Appeals that the provisions of AEDPA apply with full force
even when reviewing a conviction and sentence imposing the
death penalty.”134
TWO COURTS, AND A LOOK AHEAD
We have suggested that the 2015-2016 Term had two
Courts, one with Justice Antonin Scalia and one without. With
such a private governmental entity, it is difficult to assess how
his passing affected the remaining justices’ decision making.
His death would not likely have changed the outcomes of any
criminal cases decided in the second half of the Term. Yet his
was such a strong voice that it is difficult to imagine the opin-
ions not being shaped by him in some way. And there is always
the possibility, nay, probability, that the justices decided the
cases as they did to avoid a 4-4 tie.
The 2016-2017 Term is now underway, with a number of
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important criminal-law cases on the docket. For starters, Pena-
Rodriguez v. Colorado135 will examine whether evidence of
racial bias may be used to impeach a jury’s verdict. And Moore
v. Texas136 will explore whether it violates the Eighth Amend-
ment to prohibit the use of current medical standards on intel-
lectual disability in determining whether a person may be exe-
cuted. But the most important question for the coming Term is
whom President-elect Trump will nominate to fill the seat of
the late Justice Antonin Scalia.
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